www.byzcath.org Forums Faith & Christian Life The Christian East & West "One in essence with the Father"?

Homoousios in Greek doesn't have as much of a connotation of singularity.

On account of this, we say that there exists in the community of ousia no accord and no community with respect to the distinguishing characteristics beheld of the Trinity, through which is established the individuality of the Persons as | handed down in the faith, each one being apprehended separately by means of their peculiar characteristics; so that through the signs just mentioned, the distinction of the hypostases is discovered. But with respect to those characteristics such as being 'infinite', 'incomprehensible', 'uncreated,' 'uncircumscribed by any space', and all such things, there is no variation among the life-creating nature, I mean between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; but a certain continuous and uninterrupted community is found among them.

On their dictating this formula, we did not let it pass without inquiry in what sense they introduced "of the essence of the Father," and "one in essence with the Father." Accordingly questions and explanations took place, and the meaning of the words underwent the scrutiny of reason. And they professed, that the phrase "of the essence" was indicative of the Son's being indeed from the Father, yet without being as if a part of Him. And with this understanding we thought good to assent to the sense of such religious doctrine, teaching, as it did, that the Son was from the Father, not however a part of His essence. On this account we assented to the sense ourselves, without declining even the term "One in essence," peace being the object which we set before us, and steadfastness in the orthodox view.

[In what I have made bold, I take it that he means that the Son is of the whole essence of the Father.]

6. In the same way we also admitted "begotten, not made;" since the Council alleged that "made" was an appellative common to the other creatures which came to be through the Son, to whom the Son had no likeness. Wherefore, say they, He was not a work resembling the things which through Him came to be, but was of an essence which is too high for the level of any work; and which the Divine oracles teach to have been generated from the Father, the mode of generation being inscrutable and incalculable to every originated nature.

7. And so too on examination there are grounds for saying that the Son is "one in essence" with the Father; not in the way of bodies, nor like mortal beings, for He is not such by division of essence, or by severance, no, nor by any affection, or alteration, or changing of the Father's essence and power (since from all such the unoriginate nature of the Father is alien), but because "one in essence with the Father" suggests that the Son of God bears no resemblance to the originated creatures, but that to His Father alone Who begat Him is He in every way assimilated, and that He is not of any other subsistence and essence, but from the Father. To which term also, thus interpreted, it appeared well to assent; since we were aware that even among the ancients, some learned and illustrious Bishops and writers have used the term "one in essence," in their theological teaching concerning the Father and Son.

inde est quod essentia proprie et vere est in substantiis

The essence of Peter is not the same as the substance "Peter."

On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter - that is to say, to "this" matter - the very forms being individualized of themselves - it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting supposita. Therefore suppositum and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

But, as shown above (Q3, A3,r 1), the use of concrete and abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.

But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; .... For since we confess the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask: "Whereby are They one God? ... They are one in essence or deity

And, if you read further down (just google the phrase) you'll see that Thomas thinks "essentia" translates "ousia."

This is a separate thought but it strikes me as really very interesting (and maybe I'm just wrong): Since Jesus Christ is true man, but a Divine person, the human nature which he "has" seems, in a sense, to be both particular (ie, this flesh and these bones) and yet he "has" it universally, ie (as man, himself). Does that make any sense or am I just wrong?

3. Another important point in the Vatican document is the emphasis it lays on the distinction between επόρευσις (ekporeusis)and processio. It is historically true that in the Greek tradition a clear distinction was always made between εκπορεύεσθαι (ekporeuesthai) and προείναι (proeinai), the first of these two terms denoting exclusively the Spirit's derivation from the Father alone, whereas προείναι (proienai) was used to denote the Holy Spirit's dependence on the Son owing to the common substance or ουσία (ousia) which the Spirit in deriving from the Father alone as Person or υπόστασις (hypostasis) receives from the Son, too, as ουσιωδώς (ousiwdws) that is, with regard to the one ουσία (ousia) common to all three persons (Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Confessor et al). On the basis of this distinction one might argue that there is a kind of Filioque on the level of ουσία (ousia), but not of υπόστασις (hypostasis).