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I don't want this to go off-topic, but I think it's worth pointing out (so that a straw-man doesn't develop or get preserved) that Aquinas says the opposite. He just clarifies that we can speak of general willing and contingent willing. God wills that everyone has eternal life, but wills it contingently; if He willed it absolutely then it would be impossible for us to NOT have eternal life, which we know is false. My understanding of Ghosty's contention is that Aquinas teaches that God has a resistible and an irresistible will, and that God only resistibly wills the free conversion of all unto salvation such that the reason/cause of eternal damnation of any person is only the aforementioned person and not God. I disagree with this description of his teaching for several reasons, although I am willing to change my position if sufficent evidence or reasons are given for me to do so. First, I do not believe that for Aquinas the general will of God is universal salvation: Reply to Objection 1. God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good--namely, eternal life--He is said to hate or reprobated them.Second, that a person responds positively or negatively to grace is itself an effect (or part) of predestination and therefore God's foreknowledge of their response does not explain why one was predestined to salvation and the other to reprobation: And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. "..., it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace.Third, God is not obligated to save anyone; it is a super-obligatory work of God and therefore His choosing to save some and reprobate others does not violate the principle of justice. Although the saved and the damned "freely" choose to accept or reject God's offer, their choice is an "effect" of divine predestination. God is the ultimate reason why some are predestined and others are reprobated; God Himself prepares "unequal lots" for those equally undeserving: Reply to Objection 3. The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (22, 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Romans 9:22-23): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and (2 Timothy 2:20): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err." Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" (Matthew 20:14-15).
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Dear NeoChalcedonian...
I am not exactly sure where this apparent conversation arose from, but I do know that Aquinas, as well as many theologians, did not have a clear concept of pre-destination. They had the wrong view of what it is. And they did not take into full account the fact that God will not violate our free will
God does will that every human being come to full union with him. But that union MUST be of our free will. He does not want robots. Love is nothing (not real love) without freedom of will. God loves us in perfect freedom of his own will ... for us to be like him .. requires perfect freedom of our own will.
Predestination ... that is another story ... but it is not like Aquinas describes or believed. It is really fairly easy to understand. But one has to free himself (forget) from the formula which Aquinas had inherited and was trying to hammer into a good conclusion. The conclusion to THAT formula is Calvin's results.
You have to look at it in a different was and draw in some proven principles to guide you.
-ray
Last edited by Ray Kaliss; 12/13/07 01:47 AM. Reason: I am an idiot :)
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Ray,
I understand your concerns; the *only* goal of my above post was to describe what I believe Aquinas' view of predestination to be (along with evidences to support that description) because some took issue with my description of his view and I would like to hear solid counter-arguments if they exist.
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Ray, While I agree that Aquinas understanding of predestination is wrong; I do not believe that it is unclear at all. It is identical to that advocated by Augustine in "The Predestination of the Saints" & "On Grace & Free Will" God gives some the gift of faith and others he does not give the gift of faith. Why? God alone knows: Chapter 16.--Why the Gift of Faith is Not Given to All.
Faith, then, as well in its beginning as in its completion, is God�s gift; and let no one have any doubt whatever, unless he desires to resist the plainest sacred writings, that this gift is given to some, while to some it is not given. But why it is not given to all ought not to disturb the believer, who believes that from one all have gone into a condemnation, which undoubtedly is most righteous; so that even if none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault with God. Whence it is plain that it is a great grace for many to be delivered, and to acknowledge in those that are not delivered what would be due to themselves; so that he that glorieth may glory not in his own merits, which he sees to be equalled in those that are condemned, but in the Lord. But why He delivers one rather than another,--�His judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out.� [Rom. xi. 33] For it is better in this case for us to hear or to say, �O man, who art thou that repliest against God?� [Rom. ix. 20] than to dare to speak as if we could know what He has chosen to be kept secret. Since, moreover, He could not will anything unrighteous.
Chapter 41 [XX.]�The Wills of Men are So Much in the Power of God, that He Can Turn Them Whithersoever It Pleases Him.
...if this divine record be looked into carefully, it shows us that not only men's good wills, which God Himself converts from bad ones, and, when converted by Him, directs to good actions and to eternal life, but also those which follow the world are so entirely at the disposal of God, that He turns them whithersoever He wills, and whensoever He wills,�to bestow kindness on some, and to heap punishment on others, as He Himself judges right by a counsel most secret to Himself, indeed, but beyond all doubt most righteous. For we find that some sins are even the punishment of other sins, as are those "vessels of wrath" which the apostle describes as "fitted to destruction;"
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NeoChalcedonian,
If I may, I do not think Ray meant to say that Aquinas was ambiguous in what he taught. I believe, and Ray should correct me if I am wrong, that he (Ray) is saying that Aquinas' personal understanding of predestination was muddleheaded...ie: he was simply mistaken, not taking into consideration things that he should have. Not that he was ambiguous in his writings.
Jason
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Predestination ... that is another story ... but it is not like Aquinas describes or believed. It is really fairly easy to understand. But one has to free himself (forget) from the formula which Aquinas had inherited and was trying to hammer into a good conclusion. The conclusion to THAT formula is Calvin's results. Ray, This was my thought as well. Though to be fair to Calvin, it was his heirs, not he himself, who took predestination to it's damnable extremes. Calvin had some pretty nasty things to say about it too...but it's the CalviniSTS who said/say even worse things. Remember, Arminius was thoroughly familiar with Calvin's work and considered himself to be Calvin's disciple. It was the Dortians who came up with the stupid 5 Points contra Arminius...thus forever redefining Calvinism. It's been Calvin vs the Calvinists ever since. Jason PS: I had a pastor at one time...a fairly famous man in Calvinistic circles...who honestly and truly believed that man is responsible even for things over which he has no control. He insisted that man is utterly unable to exercise free will because his will is in total bondage to sin...but at the same time God will judge him and condemn him for NOT using his will to choose Christ. Can it get any more perverse than that!!?
Last edited by RomanRedneck; 12/13/07 07:38 AM.
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Could you supply the source of your Aquinas quotation, please?
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because some took issue with my description of his view and I would like to hear solid counter-arguments if they exist. Of course we did (hehe) being a discussion area ... we all often take issue with everyone ... including ourselves (a note of humor). If some one is right .. we make them wrong .. so that we can discuss and debate something  Most people in this forum are very intelligent (yourself included) .. so imagine what a discussion thread at this forum would look like if we did not artificially manufacture a reason to debate it. Very short. Joe: Aquinas said ... xxx .x .xxx .xxx ..xxx xxxxx xxx and xxx.
<first reply> You are right. I agree. <second reply> Brilliantly stated - cant argue with that. <third reply> Bravo! <end of thread> So if you say the sky is blue - someone here must say it is orange ... else we have nothing to debate  I missed your description of pre-destination .. where is it? Jason is right ... in my mind the only figure who got it right .. was Paul. All others (that I know about) muddle it up because they did not share Paul's good understanding of Providence ... all others see Providence as too mechanical. Their sense of time is based upon how we perceive time by the senses. That is not how God sees time. Plus ... Paul's emphasis is on the meaning of events (as the hinge pin of causation) and I agree with that. Where is your description? I would like to read it. -ray
Last edited by Ray Kaliss; 12/13/07 11:59 PM. Reason: my dog typed it
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Ray,
This was my thought as well. Though to be fair to Calvin, it was his heirs, not he himself, who took predestination to it's damnable extremes. Calvin had some pretty nasty things to say about it too...but it's the CalviniSTS who said/say even worse things.
Jason I find that to be true in just about every field. The 'experts' we often trust as authorities (in this case: Calvinists) ... have themselves misunderstood what it was they were supposed to be experts in (in this case: Calvin). My, my ... we just talked about that didn't we Jason ... 'experts' with no real experience in what they are supposed to be experts at.  -ray
Last edited by Ray Kaliss; 12/14/07 12:21 AM. Reason: no reason
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Ray, so imagine what a discussion thread at this forum would look like if we did not artificially manufacture a reason to debate it. Very short. This thread was created because Ghosty (hence the title of the thread) said here that my description of Aquinas' understanding of predestination was inaccurate. In that thread, I made the very serious claim that his theory of predestination was not only deficient but incompatible with Eastern theology, anthropology and soteriology. Not being a medieval scholar, I thought I'd check my ideas against others on this Forum who might agree with Ghosty. I had assumed that on a Catholic forum there would be at least a few who didn't think that Aquinas and the Eastern Fathers were like oil and water.
Last edited by NeoChalcedonian; 12/14/07 04:45 AM.
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He insisted that man is utterly unable to exercise free will because his will is in total bondage to sin...but at the same time God will judge him and condemn him for NOT using his will to choose Christ. Can it get any more perverse than that!!? That was indeed the view of both Luther and Calvin: LUTHER: Sect. 167.�I SHALL here draw this book to a conclusion: prepared if it were necessary to pursue this Discussion still farther. Though I consider that I have now abundantly satisfied the godly man, who wishes to believe the truth without making resistance. For if we believe it to be true, that God fore-knows and fore-ordains all things; that He can be neither deceived nor hindered in His Prescience and Predestination; and that nothing can take place but according to His Will, (which reason herself is compelled to confess;) then, even according to the testimony of reason herself, there can be no "Free-will"�in man,�in angel,�or in any creature!
Hence:�If we believe that Satan is the prince of this world, ever ensnaring and fighting against the kingdom of Christ with all his powers; and that he does not let go his captives without being forced by the Divine Power of the Spirit; it is manifest, that there can be no such thing as�"Free-will!"
Again:�If we believe that original sin has so destroyed us, that even in the godly who are led by the Spirit, it causes the utmost molestation by striving against that which is good; it is manifest, that there can be nothing left in a man devoid of the Spirit, which can turn itself towards good, but which must turn towards evil!
Again:�If the Jews, who followed after righteousness with all their powers, ran rather into unrighteousness, while the Gentiles who followed after unrighteousness attained unto a free righteousness which they never hoped for; it is equally manifest, from their very works, and from experience, that man, without grace, can do nothing but will evil! (Bondage of the Will) CALVIN: Nevertheless, there remains a will which both inclines and hastens on with the strongest affection towards sin; man, when placed under this bondage, being deprived not of will, but of soundness of will. Bernard says not improperly, that all of us have a will; but to will well is proficiency, to will ill is defect. Thus simply to will is the part of man, to will ill the part of corrupt nature, to will well the part of grace. Moreover, when I say that the will, deprived of liberty, is led or dragged by necessity to evil, it is strange that any should deem the expression harsh, seeing there is no absurdity in it, and it is not at variance with pious use. It does, however, offend those who know not how to distinguish between necessity and compulsion. Were any one to ask them, Is not God necessarily good, is not the devil necessarily wicked, what answer would they give? The goodness of God is so connected with his Godhead, that it is not more necessary to be God than to be good; whereas the devil, by his fall, was so estranged from goodness, that he can do nothing but evil. Should any one give utterance to the profane jeer, (see Calvin Adv. Pighium,) that little praise is due to God for a goodness to which he is forced, is it not obvious to every man to reply, It is owing not to violent impulse, but to his boundless goodness, that he cannot do evil? Therefore, if the free will of God in doing good is not impeded, because he necessarily must do good; if the devil, who can do nothing but evil, nevertheless sins voluntarily; can it be said that man sins less voluntarily because he is under a necessity of sinning? (Institutes, Book II,Ch.3,5) I believe that above paints a distorted picture of God and man, and consequently implies a problematic Christology.
Last edited by NeoChalcedonian; 12/14/07 05:00 AM.
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NeoChalcedonian,
The quotes you provide by Luther and Calvin, do clearly demonstrate that both of these men taught the 'bondage of the will'. However, neither of them, to my knowledge, articulated what the minister I mentioned taught. They both taught that the damned would be damned for their wicked works, but they did not teach that they would be damned for their not choosing to do good. The former is a positive damnation...you get what you deserve. The former is a negative damnation...you are damned arbitrarily for something you are unable to do. Not the same thing.
Jason
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Sin is both failing to do what you're supposed to do and doing what you're not supposed to do. In either case, the Reformers teach that man acts under necessity. If guilt is ascribed despite such necessity and the absolute inability to do otherwise, then it is equally "just" to punish sins of commission and omission, what I do (steal, lie, etc.) and fail to do (accept Christ, escape idolatry) fall under the same category if there is no freedom, but Calvin believes that I will punished both for the commandments I have broken and those obligations I simply failed to meet. My point is that reasoning of the pastor you were talking to is really no different than that of Calvin: "Seek good, and not evil, that ye may live," (Amos 5: 14.) "If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land: but if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword; for the mouth of the Lord has spoken it," (Isaiah 1: 19, 20.) "If thou wilt put away thine abominations out of my sight, then thou shalt not remove," (Jer. 4: 1.) "It shall come to pass, if thou shalt hearken diligently unto the voice of the Lord thy God, to observe and do all the commandments which I command thee this days that the Lord thy God will set thee on high above all nations of the earth," (Deut. 28: 1.) There are other similar passages, (Lev. 26: 3, &c.) They think that the blessings contained in these promises are offered to our will absurdly and in mockery, if it is not in our power to secure or reject them. It is, indeed, an easy matter to indulge in declamatory complaint on this subject, to say that we are cruelly mocked by the Lord, when he declares that his kindness depends on our wills if we are not masters of our wills - that it would be a strange liberality on the part of God to set his blessings before us, while we have no power of enjoying them, - a strange certainty of promises, which, to prevent their ever being fulfilled, are made to depend on an impossibility. Of promises of this description, which have a condition annexed to them, we shall elsewhere speak, and make it plain that there is nothing absurd in the impossible fulfilment of them. In regard to the matter in hand, I deny that God cruelly mocks us when he invites us to merit blessings which he knows we are altogether unable to merit. The promises being offered alike to believers and to the ungodly, have their use in regard to both. As God by his precepts stings the consciences of the ungodly, so as to prevent them from enjoying their sins while they have no remembrance of his judgements, so, in his promises, he in a manner takes them to witness how unworthy they are of his kindness. Who can deny that it is most just and most becoming in God to do good to those who worship him, and to punish with due severity those who despise his majesty? God, therefore, proceeds in due order, when, though the wicked are bound by the fetters of sin, he lays down the law in his promises, that he will do them good only if they depart from their wickedness. This would be right, though His only object were to let them understand that they are deservedly excluded from the favour due to his true worshipers. On the other hand, as he desires by all means to stir up believers to supplicate his grace, it surely should not seem strange that he attempts to accomplish by promises the same thing which, as we have shown, he to their great benefit accomplishes by means of precepts. Being taught by precepts what the will of God is, we are reminded of our wretchedness in being so completely at variance with that will, and, at the same time, are stimulated to invoke the aid of the Spirit to guide us into the right path. But as our indolence is not sufficiently aroused by precepts, promises are added, that they may attract us by their sweetness, and produce a feeling of love for the precept. The greater our desire of righteousness, the greater will be our earnestness to obtain the grace of God. And thus it is, that in the protestations, "if we be willing", "if thou shalt hearken", the Lord neither attributes to us a full power of willing and hearkening, nor yet mocks us for our impotence. (Institutes, Book II, Ch.5,10)
Last edited by NeoChalcedonian; 12/14/07 12:50 PM.
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As with everything from the Summa, we must read the WHOLE thing in order to understand even a single article. Prior to the article you cited, St. Thomas speaks of the will of God, and draws on St. John of Damascus in doing so. In the article on whether or not God's will is always fulfilled (Book I, Q19, A6) he says this: To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place. The just judge (in this case God) generally wills that all be Saved, but wills that particular individuals be Damned based on their actions. This distinction, incidentally, comes directly from St. John of Damascus who wrote in The Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (Book II, Chapter 29): Moreover, it is to be observed that the choice of what is to be done is in our own hands: but the final issue depends, in the one case when our actions are good, on the cooperation of God, Who in His justice brings help according to His foreknowledge to such as choose the good with a right conscience, and, in the other case when our actions are to evil, on the desertion by God, Who again in His justice stands aloof in accordance with His foreknowledge.
Now there are two forms of desertion: for there is desertion in the matters of guidance and training, and there is complete and hopeless desertion. The former has in view the restoration and safety and glory of the sufferer, or the rousing of feelings of emulation and imitation in others, or the glory of God: but the latter is when man, after God has done all that was possible to save him, remains of his own set purpose blind and uncured, or rather incurable, and then he is handed over to utter destruction, as was Judas. St. Thomas is simply directly reiterating what St. John of Damascus wrote in the East centuries earlier. As for the ultimate reason for reprobation or predestination being God, this must be understood in the sense of the "First Cause"; God is the ultimate source of all things, so Aquinas is laying out how it can be that He is the ultimate source of both punishment and salvation, and is drawing from Scripture itself on this point (the vessels of honor and dishonor). This is just one area in which the human mind can't hope to grasp the mystery of God, though we can read Scripture and follow Tradition as best we're able; Aquinas is simply putting this traditional mystery into Scholastic terms, not trying to solve something new (this can be seen by the fact that he quotes St. Augustine in saying that we can't hope to judge the mind of God in this matter). It's important to remember, however, that what Aquinas is referring to as reprobation and predestination is only the final end of humans, not the initial gifts and responses. Predestination refers to those in Heaven, not those who receive Grace, and Reprobation refers to those in Hell, not those who never receive Grace. With this in mind Aquinas says that reprobation refers to those who fall away: Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. Reprobation refers to the permissive will of God (St. John of Damascus says precisely the same thing in the aforementioned chapter of Book II, incidentally). He also says in the same article you quoted: Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is received in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true--namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." We are the cause of sin by our free will, and as a result of that sin some of us are reprobated, or finally deserted by God and damned. This all according to Aquinas, following on St. John of Damascus and not St. Augustine. Peace and God bless!
Last edited by Ghosty; 12/14/07 03:37 PM.
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