www.byzcath.org Forums Faith & Christian Life The Christian East & West Dialogue on Augustine, Original Sin, and Concupiscence

This is a dialogue I had with an Orthodox philosopher (Perry) on concupiscence and original sin:

For sake of this discussion I took my works from the following sources, since they are most relevant to Perry�s objections:
Answer to Julian (AJ)
Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian (UAJ)
Both are from Answer to the Pelagians II, III, Works of Saint Augustine, translated by Rolande J. Teske, New City Press (1998-1999)

Perry: First I am too educated and now I am not educated enough?! I understand Augustine�s view. If you think I don�t then the burden rests on you to demonstrate that claim with an argument.

Daniel: I submit that you do not understand some of the nuances and distinctions that Augustine makes to be able to come to the proper conclusions that Augustine himself does. And that is where I see that you are ignorant on the matter.

Perry: I am not saying that the following is Augustine�s view but the absence of justice in the soul can�t be what inherited guilt amounts to and here is why.

Daniel: We aren�t interested in what the Orthodox view is in this discussion, but whether or not you have the competency to be making claims about Augustine�s important distinctions that he makes. It is the loss of these gifts that man would�ve had, hence, he says �But since we refer all these evils to the free choice of the man in whom human nature was corrupted, though it was created good� (UAJ III, 102).

Perry: At least from an Orthodox perspective justice is a virtue and virtues are gained through habituation. Adam is created holy and good but the road to theosis is open before him. (All of nature is good even without justice for example.) Adam simply doesn�t have the virtues that result from habituated obedience yet for obvious reasons.

Daniel: If potentiality for virtue [or lack of it], is what constitutes the possibility of sinning, where does this potentiality come from? Does it not come from the fact that man was created ex nihilo and the mutability of man�s human nature? We are not told, and hence, we have a distinction without a difference, in my opinion.

Perry: You seem to gloss concupiscence as an immoral lust or desire as Augustine did.

Daniel: If you are saying concupiscence is immoral as in sin properly, we deny this. If you are saying that concupiscence is a defect in human nature, we certainly agree. For Augustine says, �We say that it is a defect of the good substance which was changed into our nature by the transgression of the first human being, as the Catholic Christians say, and we approve the licit and good use of that evil for the sake of procreating children, as Catholic Christians do. In that way we conquer and avoid both the Manichees and the Pelagians. The errors of each of them differ in such a way that the error which seems smaller is shown to be the helper of the one which seems greater. For when the Pelagians deny that what quite evidently is seen as evil is a defect of a good substance, they help the Manichees who say that the defect itself is an evil substance coeternal with the substance of the good God.� (UAJ III, 177) He says elsewhere on little ones, �For by reason of their nature they are good because God creates them, but they are evil of the defect on account of which God heals them.� (UAJ III, 136) Indeed after quoting Gregory the Theologian saying, �We are attacked within ourselves by our own vices and passions and are day and night oppressed by the burning temptations of the body of this lowliness and the body of death� (Gregory Nazianzus, Oratio apologetica 2, 91: PG 35, 494), Augustine says, �After all, they are not the sort of faults which we should now call sins, if concupiscence does not entice the spirit to sinful actions and does not conceive and bring forth sin.� (AJ II, 3, 7) This should be sufficient to show that Augustine distinguishes between what is sin and guilt properly, and what are nonetheless defects in human nature, namely this being concupiscence. For death is also a defect, but who would say it is sin properly? Yet it too must be healed in the resurrection of the body. Hence, �immorality� pertains to actions and not natures. He says in describing Christ�s human nature that �his [Christ] virtue meant that he did not have it [concupiscence of the flesh], our virtue means we do not consent to it and that we imitate him so that, as he did not commit sin because he did not have this desire, so we do not commit sin because we do not consent to it,� (UAJ IV, 48 (2)) and elsewhere he says, �This concupiscence of the flesh is not sexual misconduct when it is resisted, but when it is carried out, when it arrives at that to which it impels one. For this reason the apostle Paul says, Walk by the spirit and do not carry out desires of the flesh (Gal 5:16). He does not say: Do not have desires. He knew, of course, that this gift would indeed be ours, but not in the present life.� (UAJ IV, 77 (1))

Perry: I agree that that is Augustine�s position. But the East tends to see desire as not immoral or an unstable element in the �matter� of human nature. For us, desire is part of nature and is thus good. It is the personal employment and vicious enslavement of the person to their desires out of a fear of death that makes those desires sinful in their employment. Of themselves they are as naturally or metaphysically good as a human hand. I think Augustine gets some of the distinction of person and nature right in cashing out his doctrine of original sin. The 14th book of the City of God bears this out. But in viewing concupiscence as in and of itself immoral, I think he is mistaken. What he takes to be �lust,� we take more generally to be natural desires and what is natural is not opposed to God. Augustine is aware of different uses of the term but he takes the Scriptural use to be negative.

Daniel: How about the very definition of the term? ... The apostle says, that, �For all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life, which is not of the Father but is of the world.� (1 Jn 2:16) Augustine says to Julian �that the love of the world which one is a friend of this world does not come from God, and the love to enjoy any creatures without the love of the Creator does not come from God.� (AJ IV, 3, 33) And �Adam�s sin caused shame for them to cover their members, and fear caused them to hide from God.� (AJ IV, 16, 82) For the death of the body is the punishment of sin (Canon 2: Council of Orange), Augustine says it would be unjust for God to place this heavy yoke upon us (Sir 40:1) without sin (UAJ II, 16). Again he says, �the misery of the human race from which we find that no human being is a stranger from birth to death is not part of the just judgment of the Almighty if there is no original sin.� (UAJ I, 3; 25) �For the most just God does not impose undeserved punishments upon anyone, nor does he permit them to be imposed, and it cannot be said that the little ones suffer these evils to test their virtue, since they as yet have none.� (UAJ III, 49 (1)) And this punishment is not of imitation of Adam�s sin, but �through one man, not because he set an example, for that would be said of the woman, but because he was first in the process of generation. Because he first sowed what she conceived, and he begot what she bore, sin entered the world (Rom 5:12). In the same way scripture said, Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob (Mt 1:2), and this manner of speaking continued through all the subsequent generations. It did not say: Abraham and Sarah begot Isaac, or Isaac and Rebecca begot Jacob.� (UAJ III, 88)
Mr. Robinson do you wish to place in paradise all this concupiscence and other miseries? For, �the Catholic faith states in opposition to you and to the Manichees that human nature that was created good by the good God was injured by the great sin of disobedience so that even their descendants contracted from it the merit and punishment of death, but that the good God does not deny to those descendants his good workmanship. But, please, you who deny this, think of paradise for a moment. (2) Do you want to locate there chaste men and women struggling against sexual desire, pregnant women who are nauseated, without appetite, and pale, some others who suffer miscarriages, still others groaning and screaming in childbirth, all the babies themselves who wail, smite later, and still later speak, but only in baby talk, and are afterward led off to school? There they lean letters crying under the lash, the rod, and the cane, the different punishments allotted for their different talents; there are, moreover, countless diseases and attacks of demons and animal bites, by which some are tormented and some are even slain�Surely, if such a paradise were painted as a picture, no one would call it paradise, even if this name were inscribed above it, and no one would say that the painter had made a mistake, but one would recognize a mocker. But none of those who know you would be surprised if your name were added to the title and it said: �The Paradise of the Pelagians.� If, however, you are embarrassed over this�for no trace of shame should really be thought to have been left in you�� (UAJ III, 154) We also see that Augustine makes a distinction between a healthy concupiscence that would�ve existed in paradise, one that would�ve obeyed every whim of the spirit when he says to Julian: �Why do you add, �marital,� and speak of �marital concupiscence,� in order to cloth your darling [concupiscence of the flesh] with the honorable name of marriage? John spoke of concupiscence of the flesh, not of marital concupiscence. The latter could have existed in paradise, even if no one had sinned, in the desire for fecundity, not in the itch of pleasure. Or at least it would always be subject to the spirit so that it would not be aroused unless the spirit willed it. It would never have desires opposed to the spirit so that the spirit would also be forced to have desires opposed to it (Gal 5:17). Heaven forbid, after all, that in a place of such great peace there should be any discord between the flesh and the spirit.� (UAJ IV, 19) So much for some instability in paradise. Perhaps Perry can show us where concupiscence of the flesh is used in a positive sense in scripture. Again Augustine says on shameful desire: �But neither to have children nor to be born is something evil, for each of these pertains to God�s creation, and each of them could have taken place in paradise without shameful sexual desire, if no one had sinned. For if shameful desire had not either arisen from sin or been damaged by sin, it would not be shameful. Either it would not exist at all, and without it the sexual organs would obey the couple begetting a child, just as the hands obey workers, or it would follow upon the will so that it could never tempt anyone who is unwilling. For chastity teaches us that such desire does not now exist; chastity fights against its stirring both in married couples so that they do not with each other indulge immorally in sexual pleasure or slip into adultery and in those who live lives of continence so that they do not fall by consenting to it.� (UAJ IV, 42)

It seems by your statement that you gloss concupiscence of the flesh with the senses of the body, for Augustine these are two distinct things, he says: �The power of sensation is one thing; the defect of concupiscence is another. Distinguish these two carefully; do not be mistaken egregiously. The power of sensation, I repeat is one thing; the defect of concupiscence is another. Read the gospel; it says, He who sees a woman in order to desire her has already committed adultery in his heart (Mt 5:28). It did not say: �He who sees,� which is to perceive by that sense of the body which is called sight, but it says: He who sees in order to desire, which is to see for the purpose of sin. Sight, then, is a good sense of the flesh, but concupiscence of the flesh is an evil movement. If spouses make good use of this evil, they do not make it [concupiscence] good, but they force it to serve their good action [i.e. they make good use of it, for the begetting of children]. For they do an action that is only good, even if they do it by means of this evil, provided that they do not do anything on account of it. If a husband, however, should do something on account of it, but with his wife, the apostle would not grant him pardon on account of marriage (See 1 Cor 7:6), unless he recognized that it was a sin.� (UAJ IV, 29)

Perry: So how exactly is a person guilty if guilt is personal and not natural and persons aren�t inherited or transmitted through natural generation? How can I be guilty for the natural instability of my nature, which is coming apart metaphysically and over which I have lost some control (libido carnalis-a lack of control displayed most obviously in sexual excitement) if it wasn�t up to me that I inherit such a thing or even commit the sin that brings it about? If it isn�t up to me at least in part I fail to see how I can be responsible. Inability is transferred through logical entailment. If X causes my actions and X isn�t up to me, then it follows that my actions aren�t up to me. If my actions aren�t up to me then I can�t be responsible for them.

Daniel: This is a similar argument that Julian makes to Augustine when he quotes Augustine�s work The Two Souls 11, 15 (see UAJ I, 44). For how can one be guilty without voluntary personal fault? The error in this thinking is that he takes a definition of sin and guilt in the proper sense and applies that definition to sins which are simultaneously also the punishment of sins. Augustine is so clear on this that we can depend on his word: �That definition of ours which you are fond had Adam himself in mind, when it said, �Sin is the will to keep or to acquire that which justice forbids and from which we are free to hold back,� When he sinned, Adam had absolutely nothing evil in him by which he was urged against his will to do evil and on account of which he might say, I do not do the good that I will, but I do the evil that I do not will (Rom 7:19). (2) For this reason, if you distinguish these three and realize that sin is one thing, the penalty of sin another, and still other the two of them, that is, sin that is itself also the punishment of sin, you will understand which of these three falls under that definition by which sin is the will to do that which justice forbids and from which we are free to hold back. For it was sin that was defined in this way, no the punishment of sin and not both of them. These three kinds have their species�If you ask for examples of these three kinds, an example of the first kind unquestionably occurred in Adam. There are, of course, many evil actions which human beings do from which they are free to hold back. But no one is as free as that man was who stood undamaged by any defect before his God who had created him righteous. (3) An example of the second kind in which there is only the punishment of sin is found in that evil which one in no sense does, but only suffers, for instance, when sinners are killed for their crimes or are tormented by some other bodily punishment. The third kind in which there is the sin and the punishment of sin can be found in the one who says, I do the evil that I do not want (Rom 7:19). To this kind there also belong all the evils which, when they are done, are due to ignorance considered not to be evil or are even considered to be good. For, if blindness of heart were not a sin, it would be unjust to blame it, but it is justly blamed where scripture says, You blind Pharisee (Mt 23:26), and in many other passages of the words of God. (4) Again, if that same blindness were not a punishment of sin, scripture would not say, For their malice blinded them (Wis 2:21). If it did not come from the judgment of God, we would not read, Let their eyes be darkened so that they do not see, and always bend their back (Ps 69:24). Who is unwillingly blind of heart since no one wants to be blind even in the body? Original sin, then, does not belong to that kind which we put in the first place in which there is the will to do an evil from which one is free to hold back. Otherwise, it would not exist in little ones who do not yet have use of the choice of the will. Nor does it belong to that kind which we mentioned second. (5) For we are now dealing with sin, not with the punishment which is not itself sin, although the punishment results from the merit of sin, and little ones suffer it because they have a body dead on account of sin (Rom 8:10). The death of the body is not, nonetheless, itself sin, nor are any bodily torments. Original sin belongs to this third kind in which there is sin that it is itself also the punishment of sin. It is present in the newborn, but it begins to be seen in them as they grow up when the foolish need wisdom and those with evil desires need self-control. The origin of this sin, nonetheless, comes from the will of a sinner. �For Adam existed, and we all existed in him; Adam perished, and all perished in him.� (Ambrose, Commentary on the Gospel of Luke (Expositio Euangelii secundum Lucam) 7, 234: CCL 14, 205) (UAJ I, 47). Until Mr. Robinson understands the distinction of guilt that is associated which each of these three, he is never going to make sense out of Augustine�s view of �inherited guilt� that accompanies original sin, nor make sense out of passages like Ex 20:5, Gen 9:22-25, 1 Kgs 12, Jer 32:18 Mr. Robinson is using the definition of sin and guilt properly and attempting to apply it to original sin, this error refuted by the great Doctor himself.

Perry: Augustine takes some kind of metaphysical composition and the instability of it to be the necessary condition for the fall and after the fall there is a kind of metaphysical instability added to the instability associated with being composite.

Daniel: If Perry would like to bring forth some passages in Augustine that teach this, then we can engage him, otherwise, it is empty rhetoric. He is correct to state that it is a necessary condition that human beings be created ex nihilo for the possibility to sin. However, mutability does not equal instability; for a body that is in motion, without any internal defects, is stable unless acted on by an external cause. For Augustine says, �That happy state in which there was nothing in the flesh that had desires opposed to the spirit and that was reined in by the spirit that had desires opposed to it. It was, after all, fitting that before the sin peace, not war, existed in human nature.� (AJ III, 23) For Mr. Robinson, to impute some sort of instability to Augustine�s view of the preternatural gifts of Adam, it would require concupiscence of the flesh to exist in his nature. This is surely not the case.

Perry: The Council of Ephesus in 431 condemned Pelagianism as heresy and I firmly adhere to that Council. Do you really expect me to believe that all of those Fathers had in mind what Augustine did in condemning Pelagianism? How can I be Pelagian (like Cassian) if I hold to Ephesus?

Daniel: It is true that John Cassian was no Pelagian, however, he had the same error in his teaching as the monks of Hardrumetum and Provence, often referred to as the anachronistic term �semi-pelagian.� See Cassian�s work Collationes c. 13, 12. Augustine held a similar view prior to 395 when Simplicianus asked him various questions about Romans Chapter 9, this is where we see the rudiments of the Augustinian view of grace, and just about in its complete form. Prior to his ascension to the episcopate, Augustine held that human nature was capable of making the first steps in salvation by believing. John Cassian, on the other hand, was reacting to the view in Augustine�s work Rebuke and Grace. This is Augustine�s strongest view on grace. However, like Cornelius Jansen, John Casian deduces a doctrine of irresistible grace from this work, although, while the former embraces it, the latter rejects it. Both are in error, Augustine is primarily dealing with those who are called �according to the purpose� and their perseverance in good, not the mechanics of good actions, this is a necessary presupposition to understand this work. If Cassian would�ve understood this, he wouldn�t have over-reacted, but such has been the case of so many unstable readers of this work, so I�m not surprised. Furthermore, I do not see in John Cassian a strong doctrine on grace as we do in his teacher St. John Chrysostom (homily on 1 Cor 4:7): �But let us suppose that thou really art worthy of praise and hast indeed the gracious gift, and that the judgment of men is not corrupt: yet not even in this case were it right to be high-minded; for thou hast nothing of thyself but from God didst receive it. Why then dost thou pretend to have that which thou hast not? Thou wilt say, �thou hast it:� and others have it with thee: well then, thou hast it upon receiving it: not merely this thing or that, but all things whatsoever thou hast. For not to thee belong these excellencies, but to the grace of God. Whether you name faith, it came of His calling; or whether it be the forgiveness of sins which you speak of, or spiritual gifts, or the word of teaching, or the miracles; thou didst receive all from thence. Now what hast thou, tell me, which thou hast not received, but hast rather achieved of thine own self? Thou hast nothing to say. Well: thou hast received; and does that make thee high-minded? Nay, it ought to make thee shrink back into thyself. For it is not thine, what hath been given, but the giver�s. What if thou didst receive it? thou receivedst it of him. And if thou receivedst of him, it was not thine which thou receivedst: and if thou didst but receive what was not thine own, why art thou exalted as if thou hadst something of thine own? Wherefore he added also, �Now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?� (NPNF I vol. 12, Homilies on First Corinthians, XII, [3])

[Note: I submit my gloss of Casian isn't quite as easy to pin down as I suggest. It's quite difficult to impute to him a term that didn't exist until the post-Reformation controversey's between the Dominicans and the Jesuits on grace. See The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, ed. E. A. Livingstone, 3rd edition, 1974, p. 1481]

Notice that Chrysosotom believes that not only is faith but that anything that man receives for his salvation is a gift from God.

Perry: (He [Augustine] isn�t infallible after all!)

Daniel: This is true. But who would deny this? This is a great place to show one of Augustine�s errors that seemed to madden Julian the most. In the majority of the Augustinian texts (especially in Marriage and Desire), Augustine holds to a view that the mechanism for the transmission of original sin is concupiscence in the marital act. However, there are some problems with imputing Augustine with fault here. For Augustine to hold this view it presupposes that Adam be the origin of the soul. Although God created Adam�s soul, he creates every new soul from this origin. But Augustine is an agnostic when it comes to the origin of the soul. Hence, he says, �In whatever manner and to whatever extent, all who have been born after him were that one, whether only in terms of the body or in terms of both parts of the human being. That is a point which I admit I do not know, and I am not ashamed, as you are, to admit that I do not know what I do not know,� (UAJ II, 178) and elsewhere he says, �Attack my hesitation about the origin of souls because I do not dare to teach or state what I do not know; state what you please about the deep obscurity of this topic, provided, nonetheless, that this teaching remains firm and unshaken, namely, that the sin of that one is the death of all, and all perished in that one, for which reason the new Adam came to seek and to save what had been lost.� (UAJ IV, 104) See also his book Origin of the Soul. Indeed we see Augustine non-committal to this topic, which allows us the room for a more robust view of the origin of the soul without losing the substance of his doctrine. Another problem we encounter with imputing Augustine with a false view on the mechanics of the transmission is when Julian presses Augustine hard on this question, he backs off from this view and states the obvious from Rom 5:12 that sin came into being by Adam�s will. Hence, scholar James J. O�Donnell recognizes the same: �The weakest link in Augustine�s theology of sin is his view on the transmission of original sin. Literal acceptance of the Adam and Eve story created difficulties for him that he need not have faced. Throughout his life, he visibly inclined to a theory of physical propagation, according to which the disorder of the sexual appetites discussed above was not only the sign of sin but the instrument of its transmission�hence, perhaps, a special suspicion of sexuality. But it is also indisputable that Augustine was aware of the dangers of this theory and ultimately refused to commit himself to any particular hypothesis on the origins of individual human souls and the transmission of Adam�s sin. Instead, he confined himself to what he was sure of, namely the sin of Adam and the presence of his sin in the species. Given those two points, the mechanism of transmission was of less than supreme importance�� (O�Donnell, James J. Augustine, Christ, and the Soul.). This is not something that necessarily came from the Manichees since they don�t believe that sin comes from the will, nor in Original sin, but more likely he inherited this teaching from his master St. Ambrose, who held this same mechanism for the transmission. Hence Ambrose states: �And so he [Christ] was tempted as a man in every respect, and he endured everything in the likeness of human beings, but as born of the Holy Spirit, he refrained from sin, for every human being is a liar (Ps 116:11), and no one is without sin except the one God. The principle, then, he has been preserved that no one born of a man and a woman, that is, through the union of bodies, is free from sin. But he who is free from sin is also free from that manner of conception.� (Commentary on Isaiah the Prophet 1: CCL 14, 405)

Perry: You said the question of inherited guilt was simply answered by Chrysostom. Please direct me to where Chrysostom simply answers this to support your claims. Otherwise your claims are vacuous.

Daniel: What I�m saying is that I don�t need to find the phrase �inherited guilt� in Chrysostom, for the same reason I don�t have to find the phrases of �antecedent� and �consequent� will in Augustine. How Augustine defines three species of �sin� and the �guilt� associated, I see no material difference between he and Chrysostom on the topic. But since you asked, let�s see how Augustine viewed Chrysosotom on this topic, notice Augustine�s high veneration of Chrysostom as a teacher of the faith: �Do you want to hear what else this man [Chrysosotom] said on this topic with utter clarity? See, I add him to that number of holy men. See, I set among my witnesses or among our judges that man whom you regard as your patron. See, you will have to call him a Manichee too. Enter, holy John; enter, and be seated with your brothers, from whom no argument and no temptation has separated you. We need your view, and especially your view, because this young man thinks that he has found in your writings grounds by which he supposes that he can knock down and destroy the views of so many and such great fellow bishops of yours. But if he had really found something of this sort and it had become clear that you hold what he holds, we could never, as you must admit, prefer you alone to so many and such fine men on this point on which the Christian faith and the Catholic Church have never changed. But heaven forbid that you harbored any other view, while you held so eminent a positioning the Church�For he [Julian] says that it is a Manichean idea to believe that little ones are in need of the help of Christ the deliverer so that they may be set free from the condemnation to which they are held subject because of the sin of the first human being�Listen now, Julian, to what John says along with other Catholic teachers. Writing to Olympia, he said, �When Adam committed that great sin and condemned the whole human race in common, he paid the penalty in sorrow (Ad Olympiadem 3, 3: PG 52, 574).� What could be said more clearly? What reply do you make to these statements? If Adam condemned the whole human race in common by his great sin, is a little one born otherwise than condemned? And by whom if not by Christ is it set free from this condemnation?�After all, what could be clearer than what he said there: �Christ came once and found us bound by our paternal debts which Adam signed. He revealed the beginning of our debt; by our sins the interest has grown (Homilia ad neophytes III, 21: SC 50, 163).� Do you hear this man; he is both learned in the Catholic faith and teaches it to others? He distinguishes the debt which our father incurred and which has become ours by inheritance from those debts whose interest has grown by our own sins� And a little later he says, �For first of all he said that, if the sin of the one destroyed all, much more will the grace of the one be able to save them. But after this he showed that grace destroyed not only that sin, but also all the rest, and that grace not only destroyed sins, but gave righteousness. And Christ did not only as much good as Adam did harm, but much more by far (Commentarius in epistolam ad Romanos X, 1: PG 60, 475).�� (AJ I, 6, 21-28)

Daniel

Dear Daniel,

That is wonderful!

But what was meant by the Latin Church when it defined the Mother of God as not having incurred the "stain of Original Sin" as a result of Christ's prevenient Grace?

I"ve yet to receive a consistent answer from my Latin friends on this one.

Alex

Dear Alex,

You stated:
But what was meant by the Latin Church when it defined the Mother of God as not having incurred the "stain of Original Sin" as a result of Christ's prevenient Grace?

The "stain of original sin" is the absence of justice, a turning from God that is a sin which is none other than the death of the soul, and this sin is accompanied by concupiscence which is the punishment of sin. That's why my Father in the faith, Saint, blessed Doctor of Grace, who among the philosophers of antiuity and posterity is equal to them ALL (Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church) says that original sin is "sin and the punishment of sin," as formal and material elements respectfully.

Last time I checked the Orthodox believed in Canon 2 of the Council of Orange:
CANON 2. If anyone asserts that Adam's sin affected him alone and not his descendants also, or at least if he declares that it is only the death of the body which is the punishment for sin, and not also that sin , which is the death of the soul , passed through one man to the whole human race, he does injustice to God and contradicts the Apostle, who says, "Therefore as sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned" (Rom. 5:12). (emphasis mine)

The only penalty of sin that Mary put on was Mortality.

Daniel

Dear Daniel,

I don't think the East will ever share the West's high praise of Augustine, but that is fine.

That the effect of Original Sin involves both body and soul is something the East has always believed - and doesn't need Augustine to tell it.

What about the issue of the conflict between John Cassian and Augustine on Grace and the extent to which Original Sin "ravaged" us?

What's your take on that?

Long live the Cappadocian Fathers!!

(Do you make Augustine T-shirts too?)

Alex

Dear Alex,

You stated:
What about the issue of the conflict between John Cassian and Augustine on Grace and the extent to which Original Sin "ravaged" us?

Could you clarify a little more here. I think I might know what you are asking since it relates to the depravity of man, but I need to know exactly where you think Augustine is at on that issue to answer you. This sounds like a nature and grace question.

You also stated:
Do you make Augustine T-shirts too?)
No, but I don't see anything that would hinder me from doing so. Thanks.

Daniel

I'll buy one.

=ray

Dear Augustini,

Well, the argument between those two had to do, I believe, with St John Cassian (he is a full Saint in the East, but only a local one in Marseilles) not going as far as Augustine in terms of the depravity debate.

How depraved do you think we actually are?

Alex

Dear Alex,

To better understand this question. We must have a proper understanding of nature and grace and its relation to theology proper. Please bear with me for a moment.

Theology proper is our doctrine of God and specifically the Triune God and the incarnation. There is a reason why these issues were hammered out first in the history of the Church. Theology proper says everything about God and his goal for man, and tells us who we are to be united with (i.e. a creature or a divine being). Too many historians of dogma gloss theology proper as just telling us about who Christ is. That being, is Christ a creature in �likeness� of the essence of the Father, as Arius taught, or is he homoousion (i.e. consubstantial) with the Father as Nicea and St. Athanasius taught. Does God manifest himself in different modes that are all identical to one another as Sabellius taught, or do the divine persons have real distinct properties yet have a common nature, essence, and will as St. Basil taught? Theology Proper and especially Christology is much more than just who the three person are. It sets the standards on which soteriology is built upon. In essence, Theology Proper says everything about soteriology and vice versa. So, if one�s soteriology did not reflect Christology (or theology proper), then one has an error in their soteriology. This is pretty much the reason why everyone in Christendom rebaptizes Mormons. Since they have many errors in theology proper, they can�t have a �saving� soteriology. This can also be cashed out properly in other areas of theology as well: nature and grace; if Chalcedonian orthodoxy (i.e. Christological dogma that taught there are two distinct natures in Christ�s one hypostasis (person), the human nature and the divine nature without mixture or confusion) says something about soteriology, then our doctrines on nature and grace should adequately reflect this. This is why Pelagianism was condemned as heresy at Ephesus in 431, it confuses nature with grace. Likewise Luther and Calvin confuse nature and grace as well, materially they are opposite of Pelagius, but formally the same. This is why Reformed theology also has a monergistic view of Salvation, and ends up denying free will at key points. The will is a function of nature. Since Christ has two natures, he has two operative wills: both of them work together in a synergistic way. To say, that one trumps the other, would result in a strict theological determinism and only one will would really be operating which is known as monotheletism (one will in Christ).

Now, Augustine makes a distinction between nature and grace, without mixture or confusion, one that I would consider as a "chalcedonian" distinction. Although, original sin destroyed the supernatural order (grace) and leaves man with an inability to turn to God without preventing grace (Rom 8:7-8), the natural order is only left weakened. He still has the capability of natural goods (De Spiritu et Litt. 28, 48; Contra Julianum IV, 3, 17. 21.25), albeit do not have salvific character. Multiple texts like these could be reproduced from the great Doctor to show that man's faculties aren't completely destroyed. To sum up Augustine's position on this question rather quickly: we could say that man needs operative grace (man's will is passive) to be picked up out of the grave of sin for conversion, and then he needs co-operative grace (man's will active) to be moved unto justice. Indeed Augustine, is a synergist in the acquisition of justice: "But he who made you without your consent does not justify you without your consent. He made you without your knowledge, but he does not justify you without your willing it..." (Sermon 169:13). Without having the proper "chalcedonian" distinction on nature and grace we would end up, consistently, cashing out salvation monergisticly as man's abilities to know and learn God's law and save himself (Pelagianim as nature), or that man does absolutely nothing (Calvinism). Louis Bouyer recognizes this same fact about about Luther in his book The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism pp. 156-157: �For both Erasmus and Luther, to say that God and man act together in justification must mean that their joint action is analogous to that of two men drawing the same load. Consequently, the more one does, the less the other; whence, for Luther, realizing anew that grace does everything in salvation, it follows of necessity that man does nothing . . . �On the other hand, for St. Bernard and the whole authentic tradition, in one sense God does all, and in another man must do all, for he has to make everything his own; but he cannot -- he can do absolutely nothing valid for salvation, except in complete dependence on grace. This view, we may say, must have appeared absolutely unimaginable to both Erasmus and Luther.�

John Cassian, from my reading doesn't appear to believe that original sin has destroyed the supernatural order of grace in fallen man or at least man's capability for acquisition prior to preventing grace. But I also recognize his position is very difficult to pin down; and I do not believe he has been given full justice by western theologians and scholars. I recognize him as a Saint as do two popes St. Gregory the Great and Urban V. His spiritual writings are second to none.

I'm open to a fair minded reading of his writings on this question.

Daniel